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Visual Arts and the Public: A Legislative




The general public's awareness of the visual arts recently has been
drawn to two dominant themes by the media. First, the astronomical
prices commanded by many works of art on the auction block have at-
tracted enormous public attention. Second, a few highly publicized inci-
dents involving attempts at censorship, where particular works of art
evidently touched a raw nerve, have sparked demands by elected public
officials for the suppression of offensive images.
At first glance, these two themes appear to bear little relationship to
one another. Yet, upon closer scrutiny, a distressing common denomina-
tor can be found. Each, in its own way, manifests a profound hostility
toward both the creative process and the creator.
This Essay will examine these phenomena and recommend a role,
albeit modest, which the law can play in minimizing the negative impact
of these forces. Legislation reinforcing the natural nexus between the
object created and its creator should facilitate a heightened appreciation
of the arts. Accordingly, this Essay urges both that the artists' right to
protect the integrity of their creations be extended' and that the resale
royalty right, which allows artists in California to share in the proceeds
from the resale of their artwork, be made available to artists throughout
the country.
Although society cannot legislate solutions for all its ills, the suasion
of the law should not be underestimated. Clearly, the law can, and does,
do much more than merely punish or require particular behavior: the
law plays an important role in establishing societal norms. Thus, for ex-
ample, anti-discrimination laws not only proscribe certain acts, but even-
tually affect how we view one another. While the law cannot command
* A.B. 1965, University of California, Berkeley; J.D. 1969, University of California
(Boalt Hall School of Law). Professor of Art Law, Golden Gate University. Member, Board
of Directors of the California Lawyers for the Arts since 1980. Author of the initial draft of
the California Art Preservation Act (Civil Code § 987).
1. Ten states now provide for this right. See infra note 26.
citizens to respect one another, by guaranteeing certain rights it can cre-
ate an environment where perhaps respect will be forthcoming.
In this regard, it is significant that the California legislature has
sought to promote a healthy climate for the arts and the artists who cre-
ate them during the last two decades.2 Significantly, California explicitly
acknowledges their contributions to our culture.3
The purpose of art preservation and resale royalty laws is to enrich
the arts for both the artists and the public, upon whose patronage the
arts ultimately rely. For artists-few of whom are drawn to their voca-
tion by promised financial rewards-these laws affirm the ties that natu-
rally bind them to their creations, freeing them to pursue their muses.
For the viewing public, a keener awareness of that link can enhance aes-
thetic pleasure by redirecting public attention from the business of art to
the aesthetics of art.
I
High Prices, Low Appreciation
In December 1989, the New York Times reported that the ten high-
est prices paid for individual works of art ranged from a low of $11.93
million to $53.9 million, the sum paid for Vincent van Gogh's Irises a
year earlier.4 Since that report, there have been a spate of multimillion
dollar sales. Reporting on the results of the most recent auctions con-
ducted by Sotheby's and by Christie's (two of the world's most famous
auction houses), AR Tnews matter-of-factly stated that while "[t]here was
no escalation in the topmost reaches of the market .... there was plenty
of action in the $10 million to $20 million range." 5 It is not just the
works of the long-dead Great Masters that are igniting this buying
frenzy. Much of the art now reaching the $10 million plateau is the work
2. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 986 (resale royalty), 987 (art preservation), 989 (art
preservation on behalf of the public), 997 (porcelain painting and stained glass are fine art),
1738 (artist-dealer relations), 1740 (fine art multiples) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990); CAL. EDUC.
CODE §§ 8950 (state summer school for the arts), 49350 (toxic substance labeling) (West 1982
& Supp. 1990); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15813 (art in public buildings) (West Supp. 1990). CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 17958.11 (artists' live/work space) (West 1980), 28741.5 (West
Supp. 1984), 28744.5 (West Supp. 1984), 28758.5 (West 1971), 28794-28795 (West 1984); CAL.
LAB. CODE § 3351.5 (work for hire) (West 1969); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17216.2 (artists'
charitable deduction) (West 1963).
3. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a), which provides: "The Legislature hereby finds
and declares that the physical alteration or destruction of fine art, which is an expression of the
artist's personality, is detrimental to the artist's reputation, and artists therefore have an inter-
est in protecting their works of fine art against any alteration or destruction; and that there is
also a public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations."
4. Reif, Art Prices Are Still Astonishing, But Fever Seems to Be Cooling, N.Y. Times, Dec.
6, 1989, at C19, col. 4.
5. Stretch, Healthy, Wealthy-and Wise, ARTNEWS, Jan. 1990, at 53.
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of contemporary artists-Picasso, de Kooning, and Johns. An even
greater number of artists now see their works resell at prices between one
million and ten million dollars.
Of course, with such high prices involved it should not be surprising
to learn that Sotheby's, which three years ago provided a buyer with
interim financing to purchase Irises, recently found itself obliged to "fore-
close" upon the painting. The buyer apparently was unable to assemble
the necessary long-term financing. Significantly, possession of Irises was
never delivered to the buyer, so Sotheby's-which had paid the seller in
full-returned Irises to the auction block.6
As further evidence that art is rapidly becoming important merely
as an investment vehicle, one of France's largest banks has announced
the formation of a subsidiary which will solicit 250 co-investors, each of
whom will put up $40,000 to be invested in French art. The proposed
plan is to resell the collection at auction in seven to eight years,7 making
it unlikely that these investors will share any aesthetic experience in as-
sembling their collection.
The concept of using "blue chip" art as pure investment gained wide
attention in the early 1970s, when the British Rail Pension Fund ob-
tained leave to commit some of its moneys to the acquisition of art.' At
the time, it was widely reported that such art was out-performing other,
more traditional, investment vehicles. This increasing use of art as in-
vestment may be viewed with alarm. To the extent that aesthetics are
ignored in favor of economics, a total collapse in value becomes more
likely. Without aesthetic value, there is only paint and canvas and wood.
The irony is that as works of art appreciate in dollar value at some point,
they cease to be appreciated for their aesthetic value.
The danger in this phenomenon is that fine art is increasingly per-
ceived merely as an object of commerce-indeed, of unabashed specula-
tion. Lewis Hyde, in his provocative book, The Gift.: Imagination and the
Erotic Life of Property,9 distinguishes a market economy from a gift econ-
omy. The former is characterized by negotiations and can countenance
usury. The latter, of course, is not and cannot.' Hyde posits that art
6. See generally Reif, Sothebys is Ending Its Art Sales on Margin, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11,
1990, at AI, col. 2.
7. Adam, Full-Service Financing, ARTNEWS, Jan. 1990, at 54.
8. See Barker, British Rail's Runaway Renoir, ARTNEWS, Summer 1989, at 39, noting
that the real return, after inflation, on British Rail's Impressionist and modern art works was
11.9% per annum, more than 50% greater than the growth on the London stock market
during the same period.
9. L. HYDE, THE GiFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY (1979) (see
especially xi - xvii, and generally 1-159).
10. The market economy, by definition, contemplates negotiated exchanges of specific
consideration which can be enforced by the law. The imposition of interest on any unpaid
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can participate in both economies simultaneously, but only by maintain-
ing a precarious balance. Thus, it may be possible to destroy a work of
art by converting it into a pure commodity. Surely we all share the intui-
tion that the more commercial the design, the less it deserves the label
"art." The risk is real; we must not forfeit our cultural and spiritual
values.
To compound the problem, changes in 1986 to federal income tax
laws both drastically reduced allowable deductions for the donation of
appreciated property, and reduced overall tax rates, thereby making de-
ductions less significant.'1 As a result, museums have seen great collec-
tions of art escape them as wealthy collectors and their estates have
chosen to forego the modest tax benefits that presently result from con-
tributing art to museums. The temptations of the auction block are too
great. Consider, for example, when Sotheby's offered a $100 million
guarantee in exchange for the right to auction art from the estate of
Campbell Soup Company heir, John T. Dorrance. The Wall Street Jour-
nal was moved to comment that Sotheby's action closely resembled an
underwriting by an investment bank.' 2
Another consequence of the escalating prices of major works of art
is the disappearance of those works from public access. Whether owned
before sale by a public institution or by a private owner, few public insti-
tutions can now afford to purchase high-priced works. Sculptor George
Segal, upon learning that two of his pieces were auctioned for a total of
almost $900,000, declared that "[e]verybody ... wants to sell. There is
no tax incentive for bettering the community cultural good by giving art
to museums. This way it becomes a competition for private acquisi-
tion."' 3 Even the very wealthy who leave their collections to public mu-
seums often allow their egos to interfere with their gifts, so that the
public's aesthetic experience of the art within their collection is seriously
prejudiced. "
At the same time, while the public learns to associate sky-high dol-
lar value with artistic merit, little concern is shown for the artists whose
balance is commonplace. In comparison, although gift transactions may entail an expectation
of a return gift, such expectations cannot be legally enforced. Usury is also not permitted. See
generally Deuteronomy 23:20, "Unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury, that the Lord
thy god may bless thee in all that thou settest thine hand to."
11. Glueck, Donations of Art Fall Sharply After Changes in Tax Code, N.Y. Times, May
17, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
12. Peers, Sotheby's Bids $100 Million to Guarantee Its Role as Auctioneer, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 19, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 3.
13. Reif, A de Kooning Work Sets a Record of $20. 7 Million, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, at
C22, col. 5.
14. For an interesting analysis exploring the potential role of'cypres where museums have
accepted gifts burdened with noxious conditions (such as a requirement that the collection be
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spirits and labors gave birth to these works. Through the lone exception
of the modest protection provided in California by the Resale Royalty
Act,' 5 artists enjoy no participation whatsoever in these wildly appreci-
ated prices.
Like the takeovers and leveraged buyouts of the 1980s, financed by
the sale of junk bonds, the astronomical prices paid for artworks, as pro-
moted by the auction houses, may yet produce a bust. Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group Inc., the "inventor" of junk bond financing, has filed for
bankruptcy.16 The financial fallout from that failure is yet to be assessed.
In addition, the foreclosure of Irises may presage a cap on the art market:
No economy can long sustain itself when it loses sight of the intrinsic
value of the objects of its commerce.
II
Censorship: Beyond the Law
Americans were shocked last year when the Ayatollah Khomenhi
offered a reward for the assassination of Salmon Rushdie, author of The
Satanic Verses. Yet attempts to suppress expression of disfavored ideas
are not unique to totalitarian societies. The United States, too, has seen a
growing number of notorious instances of mutilation, defacement, and
destruction of art; sometimes, these activities have been sanctioned by
governmental authority. The cancellation of the exhibition of photo-
graphs by the late Robert Mapplethorpe at the Corcoran Gallery in
Washington, D.C., is one example;' 7 the defacement of a portrait depict-
ing the Reverend Jesse Jackson depicted as a white man is another. In-
tolerance of artistic expression is occurring with alarming frequency,
disclosing a disturbing hostility to artists. The artists are concerned
about remaining in control of their artworks and the effects governmen-
displayed as if it were in the donor's home, amidst the donor's furnishings), see Sare, Art for
Whose Sake?An Analysis of Restricted Gifts to Museums, 13 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 377 (1989).
A related phenomenon is the hot competition to acquire expensive cars. Ferrari, Porsche,
and Jaguar are each now offering limited-edition cars priced from $350,000 to $600,000.
Would-be buyers are bidding those prices up as high as $1,400,000. This purchase money may
buy bragging rights, but it is unlikely that these cars will ever be driven. Indeed, a former
officer of the Ferrari Club of America, bemoaning this trend, likened the buyers to those who
pay millions for a van Gogh and then hide it away. He commented, "These are automotive
works of art. People who own these cars have a responsibility to share them with the rest of the
world." Dolan, Well, Would You Expect 475 Horses to Sell for Peanuts?, Wall St. J., Feb. 15,
1990, § A, at 1, col. 4.
15. CAL. CIv. CODE § 986 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
16. See generally Hytton, The Drexel Collapse, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1990, at D5, col. 5.
17. In the summer of 1989, Senator Jesse Helms responded to the Mapplethorpe show by
seeking to deny federal funding of particular art based on its subject matter. This decision
raises complex constitutional issues beyond the scope of this Essay, which are examined else-
where in this issue of the Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal.
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tal intrusions will have. Both the public's appreciation and understand-
ing of the arts and the freedom needed and desired by working artists
may be jeopardized by these intrusions.
Efforts by the government, led by hypocrites such as Senator
Helms,'" or zealots such as the Chicago aldermen who demanded the
removal of a painting of Mayor Harold Washington, in bra and panties,
displayed at the Chicago Art Institute, 19 to control unpopular or offen-
sive expression distort the proper relationship between art and govern-
ment, particularly in a free society. Only Jesse Jackson proved
imaginative enough to defend the controversial painting, How Ya Like
Me Now?, which depicted him as a blond-haired white man. Jackson
artfully deflected the issue with his comment, "It's not the picture that's
the insult. It's the reality behind the picture. That's the insult."2
III
The Law: A Modest Role
There is much the law can do to foster greater respect both for the
rights of artists to express themselves freely and for their completed
works of art. Consider sculptor Richard Serra's Tilted Arc2 ' in New
York City and the Spirit Poles22 in Concord, California. In each of these
instances, public art duly-commissioned, created and installed infuriated
local citizens who felt that their tastes had not been taken into account.
After a protracted legal battle, Serra's Tilted Arc was finally removed.23
However, Spirit Poles appear to be protected by both the California Art
Preservation Act and the contract to which the City of Concord was a
party.24
Moral rights appear to be gaining acceptance within the American
legal landscape. The California Art Preservation Act,25 the first of its
18. Ironically, the same Senator Helms led the fight against the proposed ban of tobacco
smoking on all domestic airline flight, accusing ban proponents of excessive "sanctimony."
See Corn-Revere, The New Assault on Artistic Freedom, 18 STUDENT LAw. 18, 21 (Feb. 1990).
19. Schmidt, Chicago Alderman and Police Seize Portrait that Blacks Deem Offensive,
N.Y. Times, May 13, 1988, at A10, col. 1.
20. Roberts, Jackson: Not Insulted by Portrait, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1989, at B.
21. See Serra v. U.S. General Service Admin., 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988) for a sum-
mary of the facts of this interesting case. The problem is often born of the arrogance of gov-
ernment agencies which fail to adequately involve affected citizens by selecting public art with
no more oversight than is applied to contracting to pave city streets.
22. Congbaly, Report Warns Against Uprooting Culture, San Francisco Chron., Jan. 31,
1990, at Eli.
23. Brenson, ART VIEW The Messy Saga of "Tilted Arc" is Far from Over, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 2, 1989, § 2, at 33, col. 1.
24. Copy of contract available from author.
25. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
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kind in this country, just celebrated its tenth anniversary. The statute
protects an artist's right of authorship and integrity in California so that
an artist may claim or disclaim credit for her creation. An artist is also
empowered to prevent or seek redress for the mutilation or destruction of
her artwork.
If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, California has reason to
be proud. Nine other states have enacted similar art-protection legisla-
tion during the last decade.26 Additionally, Congress is considering two
bills that would amend the Copyright Act to provide moral rights
modeled on California's Act.27 Each congressional bill would also re-
quire the Register of Copyright working with the Chair of the National
Endowment of the Arts to conduct a feasibility study of the resale royal-
ties provisions.2"
While so-called non-economic or moral rights appear to be gaining
acceptance within the American legal landscape, the struggle to extend
broader economic rights to artists has met stiffer resistance. These pro-
prietary rights are nonetheless necessary. Census data have consistently
revealed that few artists are able to support themselves solely from the
sale of their artworks.29 Further, in our culture, the respect given a per-
son-for better or worse-often bears a direct relation to that person's
income.
A considerable number of countries already give artists a right to
receive a share of the proceeds upon the resale of their works of art. This
right, known around the world as droit de suite or art proceeds right, has
most recently been incorporated into the new copyright laws of Nigeria3"
and Spain.3 A variety of theories justify resale royalty laws such as
these, all of which conclude that the appreciation realized on the resale of
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-116s (West 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2152 (West
1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85a
(West Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-1 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2
(1989); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.01 (McKinney Supp. 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
73, § 2101 (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-2 (1987).
27. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989, S.1198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (co-authored
by Senators Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Robert Kasten (R-Wis.)); H.R. 2690, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (authored by Rep. Robert Kastenmeier (D-Wis.). For a discussion of
the Kennedy bill, see DuBoff, Leaffer, Goetzl and Edelson, Artists' Rights." The Kennedy Propo-
sal To Amend The Copyright Law, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 227 (1989).
28. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989, H.R. 2690, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. (1989).
29. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULLETIN 2300, OCCUPA-
TIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK at 192, 194 (Apr. 1988.).
30. Nigeria Copyright Decree 1988 (No. 47 of Dec. 19, 1988), Part I Copyright, Subpart
12, Right to Share in Proceeds of Sale, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE FED. REPUBLIC OF NIGE-
RIA No. 84, Dec. 20, 1988.
31. See Beltran, Author's Rights in Spain: Comments on the Intellectual Property Law of
1987, 13 COLUM-VLA J.L. & ARTS 477, 486 (1989).
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certain works of art should in some measure redound to the artist.32
Some nations attribute the increase in value to the continuing career de-
velopment of the artist from the date of the original sale.3 3 Other nations
have posited-perhaps somewhat romantically-that the higher value al-
ways existed, merely awaiting discovery by a more enlightened collec-
tor.34 Yet another justification has been set forth in detail by this
author.35 Less romantically, it argues simply that an examination of the
exclusive rights accorded to authors under the Copyright Act discloses
that fairness requires visual artists be granted appropriate additional ex-
clusive rights, specifically, a display right that does not expire upon first
sale. While the public display of art might occasion a royalty without
any intrusion into its owner's privacy, a resale royalty would then be-
come an appropriate opportunity to assess the value of that display right
with regard to art not on public display. 6 California is thus far the only
state to grant such a resale royalty; the California Resale Royalty Act
37
entitles an artist to a share, albeit minimal, of the price for which a work
of art is resold.
Soon after the California statute took effect in 1976, Congressman
Henry Waxman (D-Cal.) introduced H.R. 1140338 in the House of Rep-
resentatives. This bill would have amended the Copyright Act to provide
a federal resale royalty right. Its introduction presented an opportunity
for discussion in which this author was privileged to participate, at which
a broad cross-section of interested parties opined on this country's readi-
ness to embrace a resale royalty right. Following the hearings Congress-
man Waxman apparently concluded that the concept of artists retaining
a continuing economic stake in their creations needed more study before
a resale royalty right would be accepted.3 9 Nevertheless, there are places
in the western world where artists are paid for the exhibition of their
works even though the artists no longer own their work.4"
Where the moneys for such fees or royalties would come from is still
an open question. A resale royalty readily can be paid by the seller from
32. See Goetzl & Sutton, Copyright and the Visual Artist's Display Right, A New Doctrinal
Analysis, 9 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 15, 37-38 (1984).
33. Id. at 39, n.89.
34. Id.
35. See generally id..
36. Id. See also H.R. 4366, 99th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1986).
37. CAL. CIv. CODE § 986 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
38. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
39. The author's impression was deduced from attendance at discussion, from subsequent
telephone conversations with Congressman Waxman's staff, and from the Congressman's fail-
ure to reintroduce the bill in the next Congress.
40. For example, Canada. See Goetzl & Sutton, supra note 32, at 36, n.78, 29, n.54. See
generally id. for a complete discussion of a "display royalty" or "exhibition fee."
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proceeds generated from the resale of the work of art. In addition, a
display right would require museums and other owners of works of art
who publicly display that art to pay a royalty to the artists whose works
are displayed. Developing a formula to measure the amount of the roy-
alty for the different media, sizes and locations should be no more diffi-
cult than it is for composers and songwriters who author compositions
ranging from symphonies to jingles, played everywhere from network tel-
evision to local taverns. To collect the royalties, some system modeled
upon the "blanket license" used by the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI)
would appear appropriate.4
To generate the necessary revenue, museums might impose reason-
able admission fees, or increase existing ones. Although some museums
have, in the past few years, begun to charge modest entrance fees, it
should be abundantly clear that the market can bear considerably higher
ticket prices. General admission to a movie costs more than a ticket to a
museum. And even tickets to museum "blockbuster" shows, like the
Treasures of Tutankhamen, cost about one-fourth the price of a ticket to
a professional football game. Theater, concert (pop, rock, or classical),
and opera tickets are priced well beyond the means of all but the most
devoted. Why? If affordable access by students, senior citizens, and low-
or even middle-income persons to the arts is deemed important (this au-
thor believes it should be), should not access to the performing arts be as
affordable as access to the visual arts? Perhaps this discrepancy exists
because playwrights, composers, lyricists, choreographers, and athletes
are better organized than painters and sculptors. Or, they are simply
unwilling to subsidize their medium to the same extent that visual artists
have been called upon to do by foregoing payment for the display of their




Art preservation and resale royalty laws are not designed solely to
preserve art and to enrich artists. Artists with whom this writer has spo-
ken express an intuitive understanding that the real value of these laws is
that they oblige those who own art to acknowledge the connection be-
tween the creator and the creation. Comprehension of this connection
enables society to appreciate its cultural icons.
41. See supra note 36.
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The law can help to lead society toward this goal by affording
greater recognition to the continuing economic and moral rights artists
have in their creations. California has taken some pioneering steps. A
few states have begun boldly to follow. It is time for the remaining states
to do their part and for Congress to assume leadership on behalf of our
nation's arts and artists.
